Friday, 28 November 2014

Open Letter to Smriti Irani: On Teaching Sanskrit and Mother Tongues

If German is a foreign language to millions of Indians, so is Sanskrit and Hindi. An open letter to the Education Minister questions the policy to teach Sanskrit in schools and raises fundamental points on “local” language(s) and mother tongue(s).
 
Open letter by  Sowmya Dechamma

On Teaching Sanskrit and Mother Tongues

Dear Ms Irani,

Many of us are aghast at your decision to remove German from the list of languages that a child could have studied in Kendriya Vidyalayas (central government schools under the Ministry of Human Resource Development). More troubling for me is the decision to make the study of Sanskrit compulsory. Some have rightly pointed out the incommensurability of such a decision: the axe on German and the active neo-liberal policies that the current Indian Government is pushing forward. They have also pointed out how in this global world, studying a foreign tongue would only increase the skills and worthiness of our children, paraded as future citizens. It does not need to be reiterated it was the German Orientalists starting from Wilhelm von Schlegal in 1823 who translated, consolidated and categorised Sanskrit literature as the sole claimant of “Indian Literature”. My concerns however, are elsewhere.

My son goes to a Kendriya Vidyalaya (KV) in Hyderabad. I was indeed puzzled to know that the KV offered Hindi, Sanskrit, and German but no Telugu or any other living Indian tongue. Sometime ago, I went to the school authorities and asked them about the absence of Telugu, especially since the three language formula that they cite does mandate that all schools need to teach the “local” / “regional” language / mother tongue. The answer was even more puzzling. If students or parents want Telugu to be taught, there needs to be request from at least ten parents. What I did not understand is this – if teaching of a “local” language has to be requested for, how come the teaching of Hindi and Sanskrit does not follow the same logic?

But I have a more complicated question – what indeed is “local”? Or what is one’s “mother tongue”? In Hyderabad, given its social geography, Urdu is equally local as is Telugu. Urdu was the medium of instruction for centuries until the 1956 linguistic reorganisation of states. Urdu implied culture and sophistication, had a “proper” history and culture, and unlike Sanskrit was and is accessible to all. Urdu not only has a cultural history but also has a popular one so evident in cinema from Mumbai: it is Urdu cinema we consume not Hindi as has been pointed out so very often. So then, why not Urdu? What does Sanskrit suggest that Urdu doesn’t? Let’s forget Urdu for a little while and ask -- what about other local languages that are not considered worthy enough to be included in the 8th schedule and modern enough to be called modern Indian languages? Telangana, where I now live has many such languages pretty much like elsewhere in India. Banjara, Gondi, Konda, Kui, Kuvi, Pengo and Manda are just to name a few. So, if the dominant local in Hyderabad is Urdu and Telugu, the local in Adilabad should be Gondi among others. If children learn best in their mother tongues, why not their own tongue?

I mention these languages because my children do not have a single mother tongue – one is Kodava, a language of Kodagu from Karnataka and another Telugu. Kodava like the above languages mentioned is oral and therefore does not become part of the list of languages desired in modern nation states. Historically, the idea of mother tongue is a recent invention. Sumathy Ramaswamy, Lisa Mitchell and Francesca Orsini have beautifully shown how mother tongues in the cases of Tamil, Telugu and Hindi respectively have been built over a period of time, how the construction of a mother tongue is largely an intellectual enterprise and how the idea of mother tongue is based on certain exclusionary strategies. More importantly I mention these “small” languages because I think there is a need to recover differences, a need to distinguish between lives practiced and imagined histories that have supposedly bound us together. The People’s Linguistic Survey of India 2013 mentions that there are over 780 languages in India. Of these 780, around 210 languages belong to the north east India. How many of us can even name two among these 210 rich, diverse, north eastern Languages? Why should one bother? It is "they" who should know what is "ours", not the other way round. Never in human history has "who has to know what" been naïve and bereft of power. In such a scenario when it would be immensely worthwhile to explore ways to study these languages, why Sanskrit?

Unlike German, Urdu, Hindi, Telugu and indeed English, these languages do not have the factor of “usability” or a writable history. If German is foreign, so is English. What do we do with it now? Stretching a little further, Sanskrit is foreign as well to most Indians. But then, languages grow, die, borrow, give, and evolve constantly. What is somebody else’s now like English will become ours now either by direct or indirect forces of power. Aren’t we proud of Tamil being one of the official languages of Singapore? Do we not gloat that Hindi, Bangla, Tamil, Sanskrit, etc are taught in America, Canada, Europe and other places? That Hindi / Urdu cinema has an industry of its own in Nigeria is of huge consequence for us not only in terms of profit but also in matters of cultural-pride.

I am sure you are aware that it was not very long ago that Sanskrit as a language, as a carrier of privileged knowledge was denied to a majority of people, even if they wanted to learn it. It is no wonder that a language and knowledge it carried that was so well guarded within the still unbreakable walls of caste practices, died a natural death. Given the contemporary situation where it is mostly children of “backward” and “lower” castes who attend government schools, whose histories have no memory of Sanskrit, isn’t it ironical that what was once denied to them is now made mandatory, even when they do not want it? The upper classes/castes to whom Sanskrit can be said to have belonged once choose between French or German or Spanish in their hip private schools.

May be we need to think as to why the recovery of difference from very “local” spaces becomes essential. Because it gives each one of us a space to claim as our own, because only then there is resistance to the merging of histories and spiritual symbols, because only then the indifference to histories of “small” people with small languages can teach us many a thing -- in schools or elsewhere.

I am hoping that you will reverse this decision and will come up with more innovative ideas as to how and what our children learn.

Sowmya Dechamma (sowmyadechamma@uohyd.ac.in) is at the Centre for Comparative Literature, University of Hyderabad.
 
{ Courtsey: EPW, Vol. 49, Issue No.47, November 22, 2014 }

Wednesday, 26 November 2014

Double of Modernity and Education and Pedagogy: Sasheej Hegde

The most natural and perfect work is to generate its like. – An Alchemist’s Wisdom 
Always responsive to the challenge that modernity implies for education and pedagogy – as indeed the converse, the encounter of education/pedagogy with modernity – the contribution of Krishna Kumar (hereinafter KK) entitled “Rurality, Modernity and Education” (EPW, 31 May 2014: 38-43) alerts us to the double bind of possibility and impossibility that lies at the very core of modern education and pedagogy. 

Indeed, if KK’s thesis is plausible (which it is), then the effectiveness of all short-term measures and compromises with reference to curriculum and pedagogy come into question. This constraint may be further addressed by the following question: how can KK’s understanding of the reciprocal challenge posed by modernity and education give any concrete account of the singularity of educational practices when they seem to be irreducibly structured by the double bind of modern education and pedagogy? My effort, in this response, is to make clear and re-thematise this double bind.

My point precisely is this: if (modern) education and pedagogy are about both possibility and impossibility, then a reflection adequate to this state of affairs needs to be effected; and, what is more, that if the current stalemate about educational reform and pedagogy which KK’s essay documents so well is to be surpassed, then we need to be augmenting our thinking about modern educational practices at whatever level.

Engaging the Double Bind

I have discussed aspects of the question in two recent pieces in the EPW, one analysing the issue of “critical pedagogy” as contextualised to the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) textbook cartoon controversy revolving around B R Ambedkar (EPW, 5 October 2013: 66-72) and the other devoted to the forwarding of the claims of (what I had characterised) “method-centred” research pedagogy (EPW, 1 February 2014: 63-68). It may not be necessary to recapitulate the ground of these two forays, except to admit and affirm with them that the current edginess over educational practices has also to do with an “undecidability” about the tools and resources of a modern critical pedagogy. Importantly yet, we can see KK’s attempt as adding another dimension to the deadlock, one having to do with the force of the declarative act underlying modern education and pedagogy, namely, the programmatical thesis, taken to be central to modernity, that far from education creating modernity, “it (education) embodies modernity inasmuch as its own encounter with modernity has transformed it so vitally” (p 38).

Allow me to foreground the problem in the context of KK, before venturing ahead. Having set up a broad contrast between modernity (whose “leading edge” is urban life) and rurality (or rural living), KK goes on to pose sharply the following “paradox for education”: “The association of modernity with urban life poses a paradox for education because modernity in education is rooted in a pedagogic culture which is essentially rural” (p 38). While this in itself need not produce the double bind of modern education and pedagogy that we are here interested to engage, it is what KK goes on to say that foregrounds the double bind of possibility and impossibility taken to constitute the core of modern education. Let us thematise from within KK. Working through fragments of an expansive history of education in India (incorporating both colonial and post-Independence history), KK finds in the context of these changes a “new grammar of rural-urban relations” taking shape, with the “town or the city connot(ing) aim or intended direction, whereas the village connoted a sacrificed belonging” (p 39). Aside from this “existential grammar” however, as KK astutely reminds, “the town and the village are related to each other as epistemic entities in a parallel grammar of modernity”, according to which the “town is where knowledge about the village is created and stored” and in terms of which “the village, as an object of consciously and assiduously organised knowledge, is born in the city” (p 40).

Quite clearly, some aspects of the double bind that structures modern education and pedagogy are apparent here, even if KK does not himself formulate it as such. It is when he goes on to explore the “rural response to modernity” that what we are calling the double bind becomes even more evident and challenging. KK is concerned to sound the limits of a “modernity” in education that is “rooted in a pedagogic culture which is essentially rural” (p 38), and which “involved the transmission of modern ideas to the villager” (p 40). Having stated so, KK shifts gear, turning to the “new realities” of rural India and striving to “examine what these changes might mean in terms of rural modernity” (p 41).

Foregrounding the point that “the state’s attempt to universalise elementary education” (as combined with “the general social trend towards literacy”) has meant that sizeable sections of the rural population “now possess the rudimentary skills associated with literacy than was the case at any earlier point in modern history” (p 42), he pointedly asks about “how these new elements might shape our perception of rural modernity” (p 42). KK here quickly dismisses the validity of “general answers”, but asserts, all the same, that there is a persistence of “gender and caste-based disparities in literacy, employment and children’s education” (p 42). He highlights the limits of government reports, all too fixed as they are on “enrolment data”, discounting (in the context of gender) the “length of girls’ education and the quality of their experience at school” and (in the context of caste) the “handling of mixed-caste classrooms by teachers” (p 42), while going on to maintain, starkly, that the “same programmes that pushed enrolment high have also diluted the village teacher’s economic status and professional identity” (p 42).

A Movement Across

Having formulated, on our terms, aspects of the double bind that encapsulates modern education and pedagogy, we must probe this condition further. A question that will concern us here is: what kind of normative and theoretical weight can we lend to this double bind/paradox? For KK, as we have seen, education has been “one of the prime means through which the grammar of rural-urban relations ...has been internalised by successive generations of the rural population” (p 42), a point which, we must stress, is in keeping with his emphasis that education “is not merely a measure of modernity, but also the designer of its inner nature and meaning” (emphasis added). The latter lines which I have italicised are particularly noteworthy, and we will return to it later.

For the moment, let us look at what KK infers from this prognosis. As he writes, “(i)n the history of modern Indian education ...the curriculum has primarily served as a means of dissemination and control”, and in this light wryly observes that “(a)s a vehicle of modernity, education [has] remained largely empty of modern pedagogic values” (p 43). He is clear that “the village we construct with our modern, urban imagination is at least partly a myth of our making” and that “(o)ne contribution of modern education and its curriculum has been to reinforce a polarity between rural and urban living” (p 43). Accordingly, even as he avers that the “reality of both villagers and city-dwellers may offer far greater evidence of an overlap than a polarity”, KK underscores the point that the “insistence that the remaining agenda of modernity is mainly in villages often leads to distorted priorities” (p 43).

Without doubt, it is not the historical and/or logical plausibility of these ideas that I am interested to query here (and there is much that one could say on this score). My concern, as already indicated, is with the kind of normative and theoretical weight we can be lending to the framework of these ideas. In rendering, as we have, his “paradox for education” as a double bind of possibility and impossibility that structures modern education and pedagogy, KK may yet object to the interpretation that we are placing on his text/rendition.

He has every right to do so. But it may be worthwhile, for one and all (including KK), to consider the following (and I am afraid I am going to be synoptic here): (i) interpretation must often involve working with the grain of a text (without, of course, twisting its contents); (ii) we must avoid over-simplifying (or trivialising) the space of modernity; and (iii) at the heart of all learning and pedagogy is an impossibility of ever attaining it in all its possibility. Lest I be misunderstood, I must hasten to add that I am certainly not implying that KK’s understanding of modernity is trivial and/or that his erudite and thoughtful probings of modern education and pedagogy (both here in the short text that we are here complicating and elsewhere in his wider corpus) are flawed.

My point precisely (one, incidentally, in the spirit of KK) is that if we need to be augmenting our thinking about modern education and pedagogy, then the various aspects of the current stalemate over educational practices and the reform of those practices need to be addressed. Obviously, KK is concerned to push the normative weight of his prognosis in the direction of a “fresh vision of rural modernity and education” and which takes “the rural teacher’s agency seriously” (p 43); I am interested to thematise something different though. Allow me to reformulate.

Grounds for a Re-thematisation

All too often, disquisitions about change (within an institutional realm or across them) take the form of an evasion of the changes. I am not saying that this has happened with KK, but to insist – as I do – that change cannot be applied to any referent does not mean that it cannot be used for an act of reference. In this oscillation between a possible referent of change and the use of changes in an act of reference, there lurks an ambiguity about whether a set of changes can be interpreted and seen as consistent or inconsistent without bringing in something external to change.

It is the normative strength of KK’s argument that he bases it on, as we just saw, a “fresh vision of rural modernity and education”. On a rough understanding of that interpretation, it is an attempt above all to comprehend modernity and education/pedagogy through change (rather than comprehending change through modernity/education). The difference is difficult, yet crucial, and it has to do with what happens when, subjected to the pressure of a dynamical object, namely, change – the fact and the value of change – one (as analyst or interpreter of changes) decides to consider it as (if you will) a terminus ad quo rather than as a terminus ad quem. That is to say, an analysis devoted less to the end-point of a process of change (terminus ad quem) than an analysis of the ways in which changes are produced (terminus ad quo). Those given over to questions of educational reform and pedagogy at whatever level cannot avoid the ground that KK traverses therefore; and yet, we need to be thinking further about educational practices and measures of/for critical pedagogy.

It is very hard to give a critical justification for any clear contrast between modernity and education/pedagogy, although it has been constantly resorted to in the historical study of cultural forms. I do not doubt a causal connection between them, of course. But what seems very much a question is whether this causal relation is effected and mediated by what? Also, how is their necessity being framed – in relation to what and in what terms?

Summarily, inquiries into the causality of modern education and pedagogy take such forms as, say, “how did modern education secure itself and with what consequences?” or “what makes modernity capitalise on education and pedagogy as instruments of change?” and, again, “what is it in modern education and pedagogy that gives rise to modernity?” – investigations structured, clearly, by the expectation that some causal activity procured certain effect by means of some kind of force or immanent logic. Not that such a line of questioning is in principle unjustified or in practice useless; they even could correspond to the way things (have) come to be and thus elicit something internal to a process of institutional becoming. But I think it is vain to keep pressing the inquiry in such terms when the answers do not always justify them; and it leads only to confusion and miscomprehension then to posit classes of phenomena which correspond not to the answers received but to the questions put.

Note that my problem is not quite the logical ease with which we confuse “preconditions” (plainly, the histories of what led up to something) and “effects” (the aggregate of the changes which that something causes or that unfold in respect to it). Rather – and to limit ourselves to the double bind of modern education and pedagogy – I am trying to draw attention to the “undecidability” of modernity wherein (or whereby) the significance and status of educational practices and decisions continually change or differentiate themselves and are consequently inaccessible (or, even, ultimately meaningless). On this register, whose full contours I am afraid I cannot unravel, the singularity or unicity of (any) modernity – connected or unconnected with formal education and pedagogy – would be undecidable.

KK, I am inclined to think, has some measure of the problem, but does not push it through, remaining content with the claim that education (as we highlighted in the previous section of our commentary) “is not merely a measure of modernity, but also the designer of its inner nature and meaning” (p 42). Indeed, this diffidence only heightens the problem, so that even as KK is appropriately keen to record the encounter of modernity and education, the surface on which this encounter is staged (namely, rurality) ends up reinforcing the very antinomies that structured the encounter in the first place. There is also, I think, a short circuiting of the discourse – and meta-discourse – of learning processes organised in the institutional form (whether school, college, or university), which is further accentuated when KK alludes to the “rural” character of pedagogic modernism. But that would take a longer process of unravelling than what the EPW would allow. Hopefully, in the event of a dialogue developing in these pages, I can delve into this axis of inquiry.

This response to Krishna Kumar's "Rurality, Modernity and Education" (EPW, 31 May 2014) attempts to make clear and re-thematise the double bind of modern education and pedagogy.

{ Sasheej Hegde (sasheej@gmail.com) teaches sociology at the University of Hyderabad. }

From : EPW,

Thursday, 2 October 2014

Oh God, save me from my friends, followers and flatterers: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle With India is a 2011 biography of Indian political and spiritual leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi written by Pulitzer Prize-winning author Joseph Lelyveld and published by Alfred A Knopf, Harper Collins | Pages: 452 | Rs. 699

“Oh God” God”, Gandhi once said, “save me from my friends, followers and flatterers”. It’s remarkable how Gandhi—someone who seems to transmit a clear, direct message, whose life seems to follow a defined parabola, whose place in history we are sure we know—continues to surprise and unsettle. In his own life, he went through a parade of identities, and so too in his afterlife. But it’s not just that each age will have it’s own Gandhi.

There is something deeply discomfiting about the life as it was actually lived—before it was tidied up by his self-appointed friends, followers and flatterers into a Life that now apparently requires protection by our politicians.

Gandhi appeared to embody harmony and unity, yet his own life consisted of anything but those qualities—often impulsive, inconsistent, conflictual, fragmented. He would launch political initiatives like satyagrahas and civil disobedience, then abruptly end them; he would establish communities and ashrams, and move on; he would win the leadership of the Congress, and then retire to spinning and toilet cleaning; he would enter into intimate friendships, then turn away. He insisted that his own life and action was of a piece with his thought and principles—yet repeatedly they pulled in different directions.

So it is common to search for some unifying thread to his life: something that can explain the eccentric shape of a life at once monumental and elusive to the naked eye. Some have delved into psychology, some look to religion and ethics, others to political opportunism. Joseph Lelyveld, in his new portrait, hopes to find it in Gandhi’s fundamental feeling for the lowliest—and he wants to show that such empathy wasn’t a natural stance for Gandhi, but one won (and only ever partially) through his experiences—and which required Gandhi to struggle with his own prejudice-bound self.

That emphasis leads Lelyveld to focus his intellectual energies on the twenty-two years that Gandhi spent in South Africa. Those years, Lelyveld claims, were formative, taking Gandhi to the belief—well-founded, but never quite as well-founded as Gandhi himself liked to think and put about—that he could see the world from the bottom up, that he could fathom as few others the needs and hopes of the most oppressed, and that he had therefore an unquestionable right to speak for them.

Lelyveld, a former senior journalist and editor with the New York Times who has done stints in both South Africa and India, ought to be well-placed to bring news of Gandhi’s time there, and the first third of his book, devoted to Gandhi in South Africa, is by far the most illuminating and worthwhile.

Worthwhile for two reasons. Lelyveld shows in a more thorough way than before Gandhi’s deeply ambiguous, struggle-filled efforts to deal with religion, caste and race in South Africa. What Gandhi experienced in South Africa, through his close encounters with the Muslims, lower castes and indentured labourers of the Indian community, and more incompletely through his more distant relations with Africans (whom he largely excluded from his struggles to win rights), would serve as the psychic material out of which he forged his distinctive universalism—a universalism rooted in the claims of the minority and the marginal.

Don’t reduce a deep, intimate friendship and Gandhi’s experimentalism to the cosiness of a gay relationship, warns Sunil Khilnani.

The second reason is that this book helps us to better understand the steps by which Gandhi came to experiment with and ultimately dispense with that bedrock of any—and especially Indian—society: the family. Gandhi treasured domesticity, but despised the family. He came to see the family as the channel through which were transmitted the poisons of caste segregation, religious intolerance and material possessiveness—the entrapments of purity and property. Breaking the family’s monopoly over domesticity was perhaps Gandhi’s most socially radical move—and it was only possible for him to do this in South Africa. There, he could discover new forms of domesticity—with individuals, couples, communities.

In 1904, Gandhi met Henry Polak, an erudite 21-year-old Johannesburg editor, who discussed Tolstoy with Gandhi and introduced him to the work of John Ruskin—which immediately inspired Gandhi to set up Phoenix Farm, his first experiment in communal living. His own family, Kasturba and their four sons, drove him batty—and even before Phoenix Farm got going, Gandhi had invited Polak into his household. A couple of years later, Gandhi would himself walk away from Phoenix, leaving behind his wife and children, to move in with Polak and his young wife—the first of a procession of inventive menages that Gandhi would create for himself.

The oddest—and yet in some ways most direct—of these domestic try-outs was the almost two years he enjoyed with Hermann Kallenbach, a ‘muscle Jew’ from East Prussia—gymnast, athlete, successful architect and wealthy bon viveur. Gandhi closed down these last two of his companion’s activities, but not before Kallenbach’s wealth was used to purchase the 1,000 acres that became yet another communal laboratory, Tolstoy Farm. Before the farm, the two men lived together in several properties of Kallenbach’s, and for a while also in a tent.

For anyone who has read Gandhi’s letters to Kallenbach (unfortunately we don’t have Kallenbach’s—Gandhi destroyed them), full of playful teasing (Gandhi, ‘Upper House’, always addressed his partner as ‘Lower House’), anyone who has seen the careful way in which Kallenbach preserved everything and anything to do with his time with Gandhi, it is impossible not to conclude that this was indeed an extraordinarily deep and loving friendship. It clearly involved physical intimacy—though whether related to reasons of health, or to passion we shall never know. Gandhi had by this point adopted celibacy, and he imposed it upon Kallenbach—though with what rigour we also cannot know.

It’s actually rather wonderful to notice these things about Gandhi. It confirms him as one of the greatest experimentalists that India has ever produced, experimenting with truth, in pursuit of truth, in a way that was more radical than perhaps any Indian before or after him. It seems absurd to reduce Gandhi’s profound and vast existential experimentalism to the cosiness of a gay relationship—as we’ve done, ahead of reading Lelyveld’s book and led by the suggestions of a sour British historian-reviewer.

Friendship is the crucial word here. For what we can see is how, for Gandhi, friendship would become the highest form of human relationship—a bond devoid of instrumental aspects, purely voluntary, and between equals: compelled neither by legal contract nor instinctual passion. In later life, it was friendship that Gandhi insisted on as the basic political relationship—one that could convert the enmities of religion, inequalities of caste, or injuries of imperialism, into mutual human recognition. It was friendship that Gandhi sought with Jinnah, Ambedkar and Mountbatten—as well as with those more intimate with him.

His interest in celibacy, though usually explained in terms of his interest in Brahmacharya, was not merely about abstinence: it was about abstinence in order to enjoy the pleasures of disinterested companionship, friendship.

Gandhi was prone to infatuations—after brawny Lower House, in later life it would be more ethereal creatures like Esther Faering and Saraladevi Chaudhurani. But at the end of the day—as his letters to Kallenbach and to others display, letters concerning what Gandhi perhaps mock-solemnly called the ‘food question’, which detailed precisely how many nuts he had eaten, how much milk he’d consumed, and railed against ‘full-mealers’—Gandhi was more interested in his digestive rather than his sexual organs: in mastication, not masturbation.

Lelyveld is gently persistent in his efforts to elicit gaps between Gandhi’s life as it was lived and as he later chronicled it—between Gandhi the activist and the memoirist. In the case of Gandhi’s South African life, Lelyveld concludes that while it was transformative for Gandhi himself—furnishing him with perceptions, commitments and methods, that would later define his Indian politics—it had, contrary to what Lelyveld terms ‘Gandhi’s somewhat rosy version of his heroic personal history’, decidedly less impact on the politics of his adopted home.

Indeed, Lelyveld’s account of Gandhi’s South African life is far more subversive not for what it has to say about the Kallenbach connection (details of which have after all been known for quite sometime), but in his claim that Gandhi left South Africa at the end of 1914 not as the victorious leader of a satyagraha movement that had delivered rights to indentured Indians, but rather as part of a deal with Jan Smuts, one that in fact left Indian labourers worse off. South Africa helped make Gandhi, but he had less impact upon it than he liked to claim, or than post-apartheid South Africa—which has made Gandhi one of its heroes—would prefer to think.

The Gandhi that Lelyveld brings back to India is a man fitfully awakened in his human empathy, and also one coming quickly to a sense of his political command. What is striking is to see how Gandhi—the most exotic, weird human the Indian subcontinent has ever produced—soon after his return to India, had acquired for himself an undisputed claim as the man who knew the Indian masses best, and could speak on their behalf. “Without any impertinence I may say I understand the mass mind better than anyone amongst the educated Indians”—yet, coming from a man back in the country a mere five years after over twenty abroad, it was an assertion full of impertinence. How on earth did he manage to make such claims credible to so many for so long?

No one—biographer, historian or acolyte—has ever really managed to explain this. Was it all a rhetorical performance—as the rising scholarship on Gandhi’s symbolism, body, theatricality, would have us think? Was it his ideas—as the studies of his philosophical, religious and ethical beliefs claim? Was he just a masterly political fixer—as accounts of his capture and manipulation of Congress tell us? Sheer force of personality, charisma? Or was it that goat’s milk he had begun to drink—as Kasturba, who encouraged him to indulge, might have liked to think?

Lelyveld himself concentrates on Gandhi’s social vision. He explores the Indian Gandhi through a series of episodes which he believes reveal both Gandhi’s inner conflicts and his struggles with fellow Indians: his standoff with Ambedkar at the London Round Table Conference and then at Poona; the Vaikom satyagraha and Gandhi’s attempts to breach upper-caste barriers to temple entry; his running skirmishes with Jinnah; and his final epic failure to stop communal violence by exiling himself to Noakhali.

Like all who write about Gandhi, Lelyveld has to confront the shifting meanings, obscurities, ambiguities, inconsistencies, of Gandhi’s actions. And it is one of the virtues of Lelyved’s book that it does not try to tidy these up in a simple ‘message’. Nor does he opt for the other easy judgement: which would see Gandhi’s inconsistencies as evidence of his hypocrisy. Yet what he does end up with is less than remarkable. As he traces, for instance in his interesting exploration of Gandhi’s Vaikom satyagraha, the different messages Gandhi was sending to different interlocutors and audiences, his seemingly calculated fluidity of position even while claiming to stand for principles, Lelyveld finds himself concluding: “What really shows here is the difficulty of being Gandhi”. No one, I think, ever did imagine it was easy.

Like every good journalist, Lelyveld is a skilled rhetorician in the art of knowingness. Wherever information is sparse, he resorts to the leading question, planting an idea even as he denies it evidentiary status: “Could this have been such an occasion?”; “Did it involve the day’s events? We’ll never know”; “Could the example of the white mine workers have served as Thambi Naidoo’s mustard seed” (and that’s all just on one page, admittedly a passage that represents a rather critical—if non-weightbearing—bridge in his interpretative narrative). The reader will encounter a fair sprinkling of terms like “possibly”, “probably”, and “it’s not far-fetched to think”. Leyveld’s style can be engaging, but he is also often at risk of achieving a certain sophisticated banality.

In assessing Gandhi’s legacy, Lelyveld marks its severe limits. And yet. It is true, as Lelyveld insists, that Gandhi did not abolish untouchability. But he did de-legitimise it. It is true, as Lelyveld tells us, that Gandhi did not succeed in cementing Hindu-Muslim unity. But he did make all thinking Indians feel embarrassment and shame when religious violence and bloodletting occurred. Unlike a Lenin or a Mao, Gandhi’s chosen instrument of change was not the state, but the imagination. His work was to transform belief: more difficult, slower, but perhaps in the end, more enduring?

Joseph Lelyveld’s book arrives in India apparently already pre-read and certainly pre-judged. We need to put aside that false knowledge—so we actually read and genuinely discuss it. We can then, finally and thankfully, hope to move into a new phase of biographical scrutiny of figures like Gandhi—where basic questions can be raised, taboos explored, and where we can start to see them as humans in hard times. Studies by Rajmohan Gandhi, Narayan Desai, Tridip Suhrud, and now Lelyveld—all let us see Gandhi not as the prim pope of non-violence, but as a more subtle being, often in emotional turmoil, ragged in his personal relationships and cruel to his family, a better starter than finisher, dependent on entourages of aides and adorers, selfless and egotistical by turns—and always able to command the deepest loyalty.

The idea that a politician like Narendra Modi can self-erect to defend Gandhi’s legacy, that he and Gujarat are Gandhi’s guardians against supposed charges of perversity and racism, is laughable. I well remember sitting in a Gandhinagar cinema a little more than a decade ago, at the very time when Modi was manoeuvring himself into power in that city, watching the film Hey Ram—and can never forget how, at the very moment when Godse is shown pumping bullets into Gandhi, the cinema hall erupted into wild applause to celebrate Gandhi’s death. I remember too watching the West Indies playing a Test match at Ahmedabad’s Motera ground—and when they took to the field, being pelted by bananas and greeted by monkey whoops. Today’s Gujarat, before it can imagine it has any claims to Gandhi, let alone to defending his memory, has a long way to go.

(Sunil Khilnani, In Outlook, under Books/Reviews/Essays on May 02, 2011)

Sunday, 7 September 2014

Mistaken Idea of Rural India

As rural consumption outpaces urban demand, has the hinterland actually turned the corner? Pradyot Lal & Kajal Basu analyse the paradoxical idiom:

For long, it was the almost solitary exception of a certain Hiware Bazar, the extraordinary village of 1,350 in Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra, which has some 60-odd rupee millionaires.

The success flattered to deceive the wide world about the real nature of the Indian hinterland’s growth story, or the absence of it. The picture has since had a marked shift — not marked enough to constitute a nationwide trend, but still notable enough for the rapid changes in consumption patterns in the countryside.

Make no mistake about it. The number of those with deep pockets in the hinterland is on the rise, even when the phenomenon may be limited in terms of reach and extent to primarily seven states: Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. The pockets of conspicuous affluence that are mushrooming in these key states have helped change the big picture in a significant manner.

However, a caveat is necessary to comprehend the dimension of the shift. It is not the call of financial inclusion of the government that is leading lenders and corporates into the Indian hinterland, but the sheer opportunity to make profits. For long told by increasing sales of shampoo sachets and low-end motorcycles, the great Indian rural story is having a paradigm shift. Bankers, especially the private ones, who always look for the big ones, are now joining the scramble to capture the rising ranks of the rural rich.

Five years ago, Kotak Mahindra Bank, which was more of a broker-lender than a traditional banker, showed agricultural lending as part of its retail portfolio. At that time, it constituted 15 percent of the total Rs 16,200 crore retail portfolio. According to figures available now, agriculture forms part of Kotak’s commercial banking group, and constitutes 40 percent of the Rs 21,452 crore of such assets.

That one example speaks volumes of the growing importance the non-descript and clichéd countryside now plays in the lives of men driving around in fancy imported cars.

Renowned for taking the cream of the clientele, Kotak has found a new target — the rural rich. As can be empirically established, the confluence of affluence in rural India and saturating business as far as the urban rich are concerned, is forcing several banks to fan out to less-privileged rural India. The banks have an additional incentive: they have the chance to convert the increased savings that lie in physical assets, such as gold, into deposits. Rural India has famously distrusted formalised banking (the savings-in-themattress phenomenon), but the scenario is changing.

Wealth in the countryside is growing, which has made the proposition of being in rural India interesting for lenders, bankers and corporates. Financially more remunerative farming and the real estate boom in parts of the country over the past 15 years have put many farmers in the league of at least rupee millionaires, making them an attractive proposition for bankers.

A case in point are the strides made by HDFC Bank, which started moving into the rural market only five years ago, but now has almost 55 percent of its more than 3,500 branches in rural and semi-urban areas. In 2013, it opened a majority of its 520-odd new branches in the preceding year in rural and semi-urban pockets.

Although the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) mandates banks to open a quarter of their branches in villages with less than 10,000 population, reports indicate that Kotak Mahindra plans to do more as the cost of setting them up is just a fraction of what it takes in an urban area or city.

Banks are fast realising that rural branches are not necessarily loss-making and unviable. They are making special efforts to keep them slim and efficient, which will translate into greater profits for them. A banker with HDFC explained that most of the rural branches are profitmaking, especially if the need to keep the costs low is kept in mind. The banks offer almost everything from a plain savings account to loans for businesses — they also provide ready wealth management advice. No longer is it the monopoly of a State Bank of India to woo rural targets with comparatively deeper pockets.

As an expansion strategy, many lenders lean on the village sarpanch who, according to most, is probably the best pr person or salesman the banks could have. With his network, the sarpanch could also act as a credit information bureau by suggesting who are trustworthy and who are not. It is no longer rare for rural bankers to carry a micro atm with them, which can do multiple transactions at a time, including cash withdrawal, deposit, fund transfer and balance enquiry.

This scene is being played out practically every single day in the interiors. Many sincerely believe that rural India, with 68 percent of the country’s population, is evolving rapidly and changing character with growing incomes, rising literacy and aspirations. It has the potential to be a sustainable growth engine of the Indian economy.

Multinational companies are using the growing network of mobile phones and Internet to offer products and services to the rural 

Two years ago, credit-rating agency Crisil had attributed the growth in consumption in rural India to non-farm job opportunities and State-initiated employment generation schemes. The study noted a shift in spending patterns in rural areas with consumers moving beyond necessities such as toothpaste and soaps to so-called discretionary products such as television sets and mobile phones. One in every two rural households in the regions studied had a mobile phone and even in the country’s poorest states such as Bihar and Odisha, one in every three households had a mobile phone.

Some 42 percent of rural households owned a television, according to the study, up from 26 percent in 2009.

Consumers in rural areas are using products that once sold largely in urban areas: skin and personal care products are showing substantial growth, according to a recent study by ASSOCHAM. Even when it comes to consumer packaged goods, semi-urban and small towns are leading growth in terms of value.

The RBI has reported that consumer prices in rural India rose 8.7 percent in 2012-13, while rural wages jumped by some 18 percent. The extra cash in the hands of the rural population has fuelled demands for several such products that were considered to be almost the exclusive domain of urban areas and metros. However, the question that remains largely unanswered is whether real wages in the rural areas are also increasing, given the nature of the limited employment provided by State-run schemes such as MGNREGA. The majority of the government- run schemes are short-term income boosters and the need to replace them by sustainable job schemes is largely paid mere lip service. The upbeat rural story will come under stress if sustained inflation continues.

Figures reveal that growth in sales of scooters and motoRBIkes slowed by 5 points or more last year to end just a point or so below 10 percent. That is the alternative rural story that could quite easily overtake the upbeat one if inflation and other variables remain high, warn experts.

The changes have been bewildering indeed. Even the smallest village store today offers customers the choice of a dozen soap brands, toothpastes, shampoos and the like — striking outward manifestations of a fast-changing consumer marketplace.

Probably, nothing illustrates the transformation of the marketplace better than the oft-cited success story of one of India’s largest consumer products maker, Hindustan Unilever Ltd (HUL). According to a study, two years after India embarked on its ambitious reforms journey in 1991, the country’s largest consumer goods company had revenues of around $400,000. By 2013, HUL was not just reflecting the new reality of the Indian marketplace — that of a globally integrated economy — in its name alone. Its revenues had also grown more than 11-fold to more than $4.6 billion.

Several conscious decisions helped the HUL advance. Its ability to spot the changes in the marketplace and adapt to them has been an abiding factor, claim its managers. For instance, HUL was one of the early entrants into the rural marketplace, where rising growth, better technologies and supportive government policies in a few states were combining to transform the traditional rural economy. Now, with half of India’s estimated consumption market for packaged consumer goods and durables, that rural bet has paid off. HUL retained its numero uno status in the consumer goods segment until the cigarette manufacturer ITC successfully rode the reform wave to transform itself into a food, consumer products, packaging, hospitality and information technology conglomerate.

Even the smallest village store today offers customers the choice of a dozen soap brands, toothpastes, shampoos and the like 

In the durables space, the transformation has been equally dramatic. The incredible growth in mobile telephony has transformed India, making it the world’s second biggest marketplace with more than 800 million connections.

Rising prosperity in select states is indeed luring India’s big business to the hinterland, prompting heavyweights such as Tatas, Birlas and Godrej to devise fresh strategies to enlarge their farm portfolios. Without exception, all these companies believe that the farm sector provides them with big growth opportunities as rural consumption outpaces urban demand.

A recent survey by Crisil revealed that for the first time in 20 years, additional spending by rural India at Rs 37.5 crore was significantly higher that that of urban dwellers at Rs 29.94 crore.

“Underpinning this growth in rural consumption is a strong rise in rural incomes due to rising non-farm employment and the government’s rural focus through employment generation schemes,” the report said.

There is a trend towards specialisation and value addition. Consider this. Rallis has compiled a digitised database of more than 700,000 Rallis Kisan Kutumb farmers whom it contacts regularly using mobile phones, Internet, newsletters or through its field staff to offer products and services. This data gives them the kind of raw market intelligence necessary to create new offerings. Farmers in some regions are given a toll-free number to discuss their issues with an agricultural expert. They aspire soon to reach out to 1 million farmers, and capture a larger share of their wallet.

Mahindra & Mahindra has built the world’s largest tractor business by volume. It achieved this a couple of years ago.

The steady and consistent performance of automaker Maruti Suzuki provides another dimension to the upbeat story. Its rural sales grew 16 percent in 2013-14. At 336,463 units, this segment comprises 32 percent of the car market leader’s total sales spread over 93,500 villages, up from 44,374 villages where the company sold its cars in 2012-13.

According to company honchos, Maruti sees its non-metro push as the drive to the future. Maruti chairman RC Bhargava says that the future growth of the automobile industry will be driven more and more by non-metro cities and rural areas.

The rural focus comes on the back of Maruti’s strategy of hitting sales of 3 million units in the longer term. Analysts say Maruti has managed to “crack” the rural market thanks to its focus on fuel efficiency and network expansion. Maruti, which has 3,000 rural service outlets, is planning to expand that network by 200 this year. It is also planning to double its 1,000-strong mobile service vans across rural markets.

Maruti’s rural thrust commenced tepidly in the slowdown of 2008, but really came good in 2013 when the car market saw its worst slowdown in a decade. While the rest of the market ground to a negative growth curve, Maruti saw its smaller and rural markets — with populations of less than 10,000 people — growing around 14-15 percent. Until 2007-08, only 4 percent of Maruti’s total sales came from rural markets. In six years, that share has multiplied to 32 percent.

“The rise in commerce in rural India is a symptom of how villages in the vicinity of urban ateas are also changing,” wrote sociologist Dipankar Gupta while analysing the 2011 Census.

The point is further elaborated by Jawaharlal Nehru University’s research associate Dilip Mohanty who has closely studied the spurt in the number of rural rich in selected pockets. “According to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, there are 352 million mobile connections in rural areas,” he says. “Nearly every big village in relatively developed states is aping urban areas, both in terms of choice of non-food consumer goods and spending. In fact, there is a definite trend of rural spending on consumer goods fast outpacing urban demand.

Last year, disclosures about how more than 100 village headmen in Bihar siphoned off MGNREGA funds to line their pockets and became millionaires overnight had caused a huge furore. There are new acquisitive categories that are taking advantage of cheap institutional credit, if they can afford it.

{Cover Story of Tehelka, Vol. 11, Issue 35, 30 August, New Delhi}
Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...